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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Maurice Anthony Staples timely appeals from an order relinquishing jurisdiction
and an order denying Mr. Staples' request for leniency made pursuant to I.C.R. 35. The
district court initially imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed,
following Mr. Staples guilty plea to domestic battery with traumatic injury. On appeal,
Mr. Staples argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when
it refused to augment the record with transcripts of various hearings.

Additionally,

Mr. Staples argues that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction and when it denied his I.C.R. 35 motion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Staples was charged with attempted strangulation, aggravated assault,
domestic assault in the presence of a child, and malicious injury to property. (R., pp.3537.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State reduced the attempted strangulation

charge to domestic battery with traumatic injury, to which Mr. Staples pleaded guilty.
(R., pp.65, 90.) In addition, the State dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.65, 90.)
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-92.) Mr. Staples successfully completed a
period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), and the district court suspended his
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.111-118.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Staples'
probation.

(R., pp.119-120.)

Mr. Staples admitted to violating three terms of his

probation, and the district court revoked his probation, but retained jurisdiction.
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(R., p.144-145, 149-151.) The district court reviewed Mr. Staples' performance second
rider and relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.158-162.)
Mr. Staples filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by
the district court. (R., pp.163-165.) Mr. Staples timely appealed from both the district
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.
On appeal, Mr. Staples filed a motion to augment and suspend the briefing
schedule, wherein he requested that the record on appeal be augmented with various
transcripts and exhibits. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-7.)

The State

objected to Mr. Staples' requests for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
its Order Augmenting the Record and granted Mr. Staples' request for augmentation
with the exhibits, but denied his request for the transcripts.
Record), pp.1-2.)

2

(Order Augmenting the

ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Staples due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35
motion requesting leniency in light of new information indicating that his family is
in need of his financial support?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Staples Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Staples filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of
various hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to relinquish
jurisdiction, a district court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing.
On appeal, Mr. Staples is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request
for transcripts of the Admit/Deny hearing held on April 19, 2010, and the disposition
hearing held on August 2, 2010. 1 Mr. Staples asserts that the requested transcripts are

1

Mr. Staples is not arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and
equal protection when it denied his request for the sentencing hearing held on
August 18, 2008, the sentencing hearing held on October 20, 2008, and the
jurisdictional review hearing held on April 20, 2009, because the honorable Judge
Whetherell presided over those proceedings and the honorable Judge Greenwood
presided over the orders from which Mr. Staples appealed. As such, the honorable
Judge Greenwood's knowledge of what occurred in those hearings is limited to the court
minutes of those hearings, which are currently in the record on appeal.
Additionally, Mr. Staples is not arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it denied his request for the a transcript of the
jurisdictional review hearing held on January 13, 2011, because said hearing actually
occurred on January 3, 2011, and that transcript is currently in the record on appeal.
4

relevant to the issues addressed at the rider review hearing because they occurred after
sentencing. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Staples Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Staples With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.
I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771
(1996)).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.

5

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue.

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. 1/linois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
6

certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p)roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
7

provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
8

appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
9

416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Staples fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Staples' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that

is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
10

proceedings on appeal.

The decision to deny Mr. Staples' Motion to Augment will

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts
support the district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his !.C.R. 35
motion.

This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Staples' appellate

sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Staples should either be provided
with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Staples With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme

Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287
U.S. at 69.

The Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell, "the

necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective
appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . [to} hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental
postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard."' Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas

v.

California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
11

the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United State Supreme Court:
[T]he promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on
appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of
any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Staples has not
obtained full review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court
observed that the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective
assistance of counsel in a criminal action is a review of the American Bar Association
12

standards.

See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL

JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards still offer insight into the role and
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the
district court's decision to relinquish Mr. Staples' probation. Counsel is also unable to
advise Mr. Staples on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Staples is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Staples his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
The district court relinquished its jurisdiction based on the recommendation made

by the Idaho Department of Correction's Addendum to the Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, APSI) that Mr. Staples was not motivated for treatment. However,
when his rider performance is viewed as a whole, he did display motivation to
accomplish his work related goals. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Lee, 117
Idaho 203, 205-06 (Ct. App.1990) ). "When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry
is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989) (citing to Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App.
1987) ). Mr. Staples does not contest whether the district court appropriately perceived
its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of discretion.

However, Mr. Staples does

contest that the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
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The district court's reliance on the APSl's relinquishment recommendation
constituted error because it did not accurately reflect his performance while on his
second rider.

The APSl's relinquishment recommendation was primarily based on

Mr. Staples' alleged refusal to take responsibility for his emotional state and his alleged
lack of participation in programming.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), p.279.)2 These broad characterizations are not entirely accurate. For example,
Mr. Staples' inability to complete some of his programming was caused by a medical
condition stemming from his contact lenses. Concerning this point Mr. Staples testified
as follows:
I wear contacts. I lost one while I was in county, so I only had one
eye left. Well, at the time, I didn't have the solution and the case to put my
contacts in, so they had to stay in my eye.
Well after a, the contact started to get infected, which made my eye
turn red and just gave me a horrible headache. But I tried to keep it in,
because without that contact, I cannot see.
01/03/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-13.)

This testimony is consistent with the following from the

APSI:

[Mr. Staples] also explained why he didn't want to go to group (he had a
headache because he had lost his contact lens about six months prior to
this incident) and how he discussed it with the shift commander. In the
end, Mr. Staples was sanctioned to an essay on proper protocol and
[eight] hours of extra duty.
(PSI, p.276.) The district court ignored this medical condition and reiterated the general
claims made in the APSI about Mr. Staples' lack of motivation. (01/03/11 Tr., p.12, L.24
- p.14, L.17.)

The district court never addressed Mr. Staples' medical issue and

2

The PSI and its various attachments were submitted in two bound sections. For ease
of citation, the pages of two bound sections were numbered. The first stapled section
begins with the cover of the May 29, 2008, PSI. The second stapled section ends on
page 290.
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whether it inhibited his ability to read and write, which was a prerequisite to completing
assignments and understanding the materials discussed in groups.
Mr. Staples performed well when it came to employment based activities.
Mr. Staples performed between forty to fifty hours of community service while on his
(01/03/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.17 - p.10, L.2.)

rider.

According to Mr. Staples' workforce

readiness instructor:
[Mr. Staples] has been very helpful with the Portfolio, he brings the hours
every week, and if there is a problem he is very eager [to] help solve it.
He has always been pleasant and respectful.
(PSI, p.278.) Mr. Staples was also successful in his introduction to computers class and
completed career planning and the portfolio section of pre-release.

(PSI, p.278.)

Despite this performance, the district court relied on the APSl's characterization of
Mr. Staples as unmotivated. In coming to that conclusion, it is notable that the APSI
and the district court never addressed Mr. Staples' forty to fifty hours of community
service.
In sum, Mr. Staples did display a positive work ethic in some of his endeavors
while on his rider. When that is taken into consideration in light of his medical condition,
it supports the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction.
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111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency In light Of New Information Indicating His Family Needs His
Financial Support

A.

Introduction
Mr. Staples has a family which needs his support. After he was sentenced, the

mother of his children was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis, which exacerbated their
need for his support.

When this is considered in light of the mitigating factors, it

supports the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 motion.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35
Motion Requesting Leniency In light Of New Information Indicating That His
Family Needs His Financial Support
Mr. Staples argues that the unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, is

unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of his family's need for his support. A motion to
alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound discretion
of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 1987), and State v. Lopez,
106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the

requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450).
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
17

protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Staples does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Staples must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136

Idaho 138 (2001 ))).
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce."

State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing to State v.

Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984)). "If the sentence was not excessive when

pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or
additional information presented with the motion for reduction." State v. Knighton, 143
Idaho 318, 320 (2006) (citing Trent, 125 Idaho, at 253 (Ct. App. 1994) , and State v.
Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App.1991) ).
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In support of his I.C.R. 35 motion, Mr. Staples stated that the mother of his
children was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis and that this condition has made it
difficult for her to take care of her children.

(R., p.164.) In addition, Mr. Staples

indicated that he planned to complete an anger management course, a domestic
violence course, and parenting classes.

(R., p.164.)

He also has guaranteed

employment at Taco Johns and the Golden Crown. (R., p.164.) This new information
evinces his family's need for him in the community and the fact he can support them
with income and is willing to get the treatment required for him to provide them with
emotion support as well.
In addition to this new information, there are mitigating factors present in this
case which support the conclusion that his sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically,
the fact that the victim 3 initiated the violence in this matter is a mitigating factor.

In

State v. Buzzard, 114 Idaho 384, 386 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals held

that provocation by the victim could be considered as a mitigating factor.

See also

State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 587 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[l]t is a mitigating factor that

[the defendant] did not initiate the confrontation."). The record contains summaries of
telephone calls between the victim and Mr. Staples, wherein the victim indicated that
she provoked Mr. Staple by hitting him. (PSI, p.25-27.) In fact, the victim stated that
she has a reputation in the community for violent outbursts. (PSI, p.25.) Approximately
one week before the commission of the underlying offense, the victim "snapped" and
began hitting Mr. Staples with a baseball bat (PSI, p.40.) Mr. Staples took the bat from
the victim, and she lunged at him with a pair of scissors. (PSI, p.40.) Since this was not
the couple's first domestic violence incident, Mr. Staples accepted all culpability as a
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means to prevent the victim from incurring criminal liability.

(PSI, p.38.)

Since the

victim has a history directing violence at Mr. Staples and initiated the altercation which
resulted in the underlying offense, those factors should be afforded significant mitigating
weight.
Additionally, this was Mr. Staples' first felony offense, which is also a mitigating
factor.

(PSI, p.11.) An appellate court can consider a defendant's first offense as a

mitigating factor. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 206 (Ct. App. 1990).
In sum, the fixed portion of Mr. Staples is excessively harsh when it is viewed in
light of the new information and the other mitigating factors. Therefore, the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his I.C.R. 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Staples

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the district court with
instruction to place him on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, Mr. Staples respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his
fixed sentence.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

3

The victim in this matter Mr. Staples' girlfriend, who is referenced in the preceding
paragraph.
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